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A B S T R A C T
This paper examines some ethical and cognitive aspects of machines making moral decisions in difficult situa-
tions. We compare the situations when humans have to make tough moral choices with those in which machines
make such decisions. We argue that in situations where machines make tough moral choices, it is important to
produce justification for those decisions that are psychologically compelling and acceptable by people.
1. Introduction to morality in machines
As autonomous decision-making systems are becoming more and
more commonplace — from self-driving cars, to military robots, in-
cluding drones, to social companion robots including sex robots — they
are rapidly entering into domains where moral and ethical values play a
key role. For example, a self-driven car, on sensing a mechanical failure,
may have to decide whether to hit some pedestrians, or drive into a
ditch thereby risking the lives of its occupants. A military robot may
have to decide whether to fire a shell at a house where a terrorist and
also five other possibly innocent people are hiding. (This was the theme
of a recent movie Eye in the Sky.) A companion robot may have to de-
cide whether to lie to the human companion with a terminal disease
about whether she or he will recover. These issues have ignited an in-
tense interdisciplinary discussion on how machines should be designed
to handle such decisions, and if machines should handle such decisions
at all (Arkin, Ulam & Wagner 2012; Levy 2007; Lin, Abney & Bekey
2011; Pandey et al., 2017).
My goal in this paper is to identify issues in the design of machines
that make human-like moral decisions. One key requirement for such
machines, which we will refer to as moral machines, is that humans
should find their decisions reasonable and acceptable. My approach is
to analyze, with a few examples, how humans make complex moral
choices and, more importantly, how they justify them, and then apply
these insights to the design of moral machines. In this regard, we regard
both humans and AI machines as cognitive systems, and focus on their
input-output behavior. Some researchers find this assumption proble-
matic, and maintain that humans and AI/Robotic systems are of dif-
ferent kinds, and their decision-making processes are also entirely dif-
ferent. For instance, it has been argued that the domain for ethical
decisions is essentially a human forte, and a machine ought not to
venture there (Bryson 2016; Bryson et al., 2017). It has been argued
that machines should be deliberately designed to make it obvious that
they are machines, so that no moral agency is attributed to them.
Though this is a complex issue requiring a detailed discussion, which I
would like to sidestep in this article, I would like to raise two issues that
raise doubts about this position, at least with regard to the advent of
moral machines.
1.1. Emergence of human-robot blends
The current debate on whether a machine can be moral agent or not
is based on assuming a clear separation between robots and humans:
robots are machines designed by humans using mechanical and elec-
tronic components; humans are biological beings who are born with
some genetic dispositions inherited from the parents, and who develop
their cognitive functionalities over time. However, this boundary is
being blurred slowly. On one hand, people are incorporating robotic
components in their bodies and brains to increase their physical and
cognitive abilities (Schwartzman 2011; Warwick 2003, 2014). On the
other hand, researchers are designing machines and robots using bio-
logical material (Ben-Ary & Ben-Ary 2016; Warwick 2010). At the
moment, the state-of-the-art is still far from generating a human-robot
blend that would be hard to classify as a robot or a human, but it might
soon become a reality. For example, consider a person X who has ar-
tificial arms, legs and heart; uses cognitive enhancement devices for
sight, hearing and smell; and has brain implants for enhanced memory
functions and for Bluetooth-based communication with other beings
with similar implants; and so on. X meets another man Y at a bar and
recognizes him (albeit mistakenly) through the enhanced memory
function as the man with whom X had a fight ten years ago and Y has
beaten up X. X lightly slaps Y across his face, but the extra-strong ti-
tanium arm breaks Y's jaw. Who is responsible for Y's injury? X, the
manufacturer of the titanium arm, the manufacturer of the memory
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implant, or all of the above? In this situation, perhaps many people will
maintain that X is still the moral agent. But as more and more cognitive
functions are delegated to devices, it is not clear at what point the
person turns into an android and loses moral consciousness.1
1.2. Machines are susceptible for hacking
It is sometimes argued that robots, especially military robots, should
not be completely autonomous because they can be hacked (Lin 2011).
This, however, is a problem with humans as well. Ever since the dawn
of history, there have been many examples where some human was
bribed or blackmailed into turning against their own side, or changed
their moral stance. (Consider Judas, Brutus, Alfred Redl, Harold Cole,
Mir Jafar, Aldrich Ames, and so on.) Therefore, this cannot be a basis
for denying machines moral agency. I should emphasize again that we
are taking a cognitive systems approach to comparing humans with AI
systems/robots. Hacking and bribing/blackmailing are similar with
respect to the techniques used and the effect they produce. In hacking,
one looks for a vulnerable, insecure piece of code to gain entry into the
system to subvert it from its original goal. In bribing/blackmailing, one
looks at a vulnerable personal behavior trait or past indiscretion in
order to coerce an agent to betray his or her own side.
In the rest of this paper, I would like to focus on a more pragmatic
issue. Assuming that the development of technology cannot be stopped
by creating legal barriers— indeed, there are already companion robots
that interact with people in a human-like way and try to fulfill their
social needs — the issue I will address is how to make their decisions
acceptable to humans from an ethical point of view. First, I will discuss
one approach that has been generally accepted when humans have to
make tough moral choices, and then I will examine some problematic
issues that arise when this approach is applied to machines.
2. Humans facing tough moral choices: Sophie's choice effect
What does a human do when confronted with two choices that are
both horrifying? I refer to this as Sophie's Choice effect based on the film
with this title, where a Nazi officer forces a Polish mother (played by
Meryl Streep) to choose one of her two children, whose life would be
spared. One can find many similar real-life cases, especially during
natural disasters like earthquakes and floods, or during man-made
disasters like wars. No matter what one chooses, such decisions usually
leave a deep psychological scar and can traumatize the person for the
rest of her or his life.
For example, one real-life Sophie's choice situation was forced on
Aneta Gadleva, when Chechen militants took more than 1000 people
hostages at School No 1 in Beslan, North Ossetia, on 1 September 2004
(Gracheva 2016). Aneta Gadleva was among the hostages with her two
daughters: nine-year-old Alana and one-year-old Milena. On the second
day of the hostage crisis, the militants allowed women of young chil-
dren to be released but they could only take with them one breast-
feeding infant. It was a panic situation, with the militants shouting
orders and no time to think. The risk was for the mothers and all the
children to be left behind. In the end, 11 mothers and 15 babies were let
go, with many of the mothers, including Aneta Gadleva, being forced to
leave older siblings behind, many of whom died on the third day as the
crisis ended in a violent confrontation between the Russian security
forces and the militants.
This issue has been explored extensively in recent years as what is
known as the trolley problem and its variants (Bruers & Braeckman
2014; Navarette et al., 2012; Nucci 2013). The basic trolley problem is a
hypothetical situation set up to present the participant with an ethical
dilemma: do nothing and five people may die, or take an action killing a
different person and saving the five people. These experiments, how-
ever, do not reveal what a person would actually do in such a situation,
what psychological trauma they will face as a result of it, and how they
justify their choices. Sometimes the participants provide some justifi-
cation, but then varying the experimental conditions show that they do
not necessarily act according to their own justification (Bauman et al.,
2014). Nonetheless, these experiments provide fodder for how auton-
omous machines like self-driving cars might be programmed with moral
rules (Brogan 2016). I should emphasize that the trolley problem and its
variants seem far removed from the real-life examples presented above,
but this is precisely the point here. It is not clear what significance do
the results from trolley problem experiments have for real life situa-
tions. On the contrary, we can get a much better insight into the
complexity of moral decision-making in humans by focusing on real-
world scenarios.
Such dilemmas are also faced by governments and social groups,
often in war campaigns, in starting big construction projects like dams,
in social projects like relocating slums, and so on. In such situations,
some public justification is often provided, though, in almost all such
cases it is not accepted by everyone. Perhaps the most well-known case
may be the justification put forth by the US Government for dropping
nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, namely that it saved lives of
American as well as Japanese people (Morton 1960). We can learn from
such explanations as to what is acceptable or not acceptable by social
groups.
A very useful case in point is the development of triage systems to
determine the priority of medical treatment of patients, which is widely
used (Iserson & Moskop 2007; Moskop & Iserson 2007; Robertson-Steel
2006). The triage system was originally applied during Napoleonic
wars, and evolved through the First World War, in the military hospitals
on the battlefields, where the resources in terms of the medical staff,
transport to the medical facilities, available beds, operating facilities
etc. are limited, but the number of wounded soldiers needing treatment
is very large. The goal of the triage system is to identify, through a
quick assessment, the people likely to benefit the most from immediate
medical care, as opposed to people who are unlikely to live regardless
of the medical care, and those who are likely to survive without getting
immediate medical care. It has been extended and applied to the
emergency departments in modern hospitals (Christ et al., 2010). These
days many versions of triage are widely used: for example, the reverse
triage system determines which patients can be discharged from the
hospital.
What is relevant for the discussion here is that the process of making
triage decisions has been formalized into algorithms so that lesser-
trained healthcare professionals can also make triage decisions speedily
and effectively (Larson et al., 1973). Similarly, the decision-making
process to determine when a person experiencing chest pains might be
having a heart attack was formalized by Lee Goldman. He devised an
algorithmic way to combine the ECG data with three risk parameters —
is the pain unstable angina; is there fluid in the patient's lungs; and is
the systolic blood pressure below 100 — to quickly determine the op-
timal treatment (Browner 2006; see also Gladwell 2005, Chap. 4.).
When such decision procedures are accepted by the medical commu-
nity, healthcare professionals are trained in it and they do not have to
agonize over moral complexities of each individual decision: how can I
deny medical treatment to this seriously wounded soldier crying for
help, even though I realize that nothing much can be done for him and
he does not have long to live anyway? This suggests that when ma-
chines are concerned, a similar approach could be effective. This issue
is examined in the following section.
3. Machines making moral decisions?
Humans generally show a reluctance to accept machine superiority.
Almost always, humans have challenged the machine when it made a
foray into some human domain. There is the legend of John Henry, who
1 Some might argue that such scenarios are impossible or too far in the future,
in which case the issues of this paper will not be relevant to them.
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competed with a steam-powered hammer, won the contest, but then
died immediately after as his heart gave out. Deep Blue defeated the
reigning world champion Garry Kasparov in 1997, but some claim that
the computer does not ‘understand’ chess because it does not play as
humans do (Linhares 2014). More recently, in 2011, the computer
system Watson won the quiz game Jeopardy against the best humans,
but many scholars deny that it has any ‘understanding’ of the questions
or related concepts (Searle 2011). Following this trend, it may not be
surprising that moral machines, where they have yet to demonstrate
their superiority in some way, is considered a taboo topic by some re-
searchers.
Examples of chess and Jeopardy show that when we extract the
cognitive mechanism underlying some human behavior, make an al-
gorithmic version of it, and have it run on a machine, people generally do
not accept it. This is exactly opposite of what we saw above when
humans are trained to implement the algorithmic version, as in the case
of triage, they readily make tough moral choices. So why is that when
an algorithm making moral choices is run on a machine, people are
reluctant to accept it? The example of actuarial tables in making parole
decisions may provide some answers, and we discuss this below.
Actuarial tables contain statistical data from the past to show the
likelihood of some event happening. Insurance companies use them
extensively to determine the premium levels. So, for example, insurance
premiums for teen drivers are higher because past history shows that a
teen driver is more like to be involved in a traffic accident. Evidence has
been put forth to show that actuarial tables are more reliable than
human experts, but their role in legal decision-making is hotly disputed
(Dawes, Faust & Meehl 1989; Krauss & Sales 2001; Litwack 2001; Starr
2014) for various reasons. For instance, consider some of the arguments
raised by Starr (2014) against evidence-based sentencing. She argued
that the group characteristics predicted by the regression model do not
directly translate into the behavior prediction of an individual: “… [T]
he instruments [such as actuarial tables] provide nothing close to pre-
cise predictions of individual recidivism risk. The underlying regression
models estimate average recidivism rates for offenders sharing the de-
fendant's characteristics. While some models have reasonably narrow
confidence intervals for this predicted average, the uncertainty about
what an individual offender will do is much greater.” (Starr 2014, p. 3,
emphasis original; see also the discussion in pp. 26–32.)
Moreover, Starr points out that if, based on the past history of a
group (as reflected in an actuarial table), an individual is judged to be
more likely to return to crime, it violates the constitutional rights of
that individual in getting a fair and unbiased judgment: “… sentencing
based on such instruments [as actuarial table] amounts to overt dis-
crimination based on demographics and socioeconomic status.” (p.66.)
This is because any statistical or algorithmic method based on the past
behavior patterns of a population reflects its past biases and prejudices.
So, in this respect, such methods do not model the Kuhnian revolutions
of social norms (Indurkhya 2016).
It should be emphasized here that the human decision-making
process goes through such revolutions. Consider the application of the
legal concept terra nullius by Australian courts. According to it, if a land
is unoccupied, then a settler can claim property rights to it. Until 1992,
the courts maintained that Australia was unoccupied before the settlers
arrived, and made decisions accordingly. However, in Mabo v
Queensland (No.2) [(1992) 175 CLR 1], the Australian High Court held
that previous decisions — holding that Australia was terra nullius at
settlement — were legally flawed, because the aborigines were already
living and settled in Australia when the settlers arrived (Hunter and
Indurkhya 1998). Computer algorithms based on past judgments cannot
make this leap, or gestalt shift, which becomes a crucial limitation of
such systems.
Another example is provided by Martindale's (1990) sociological
theory of creativity in arts. In this model, the society encourages some
amount of novelty to keep things interesting. But there is also habi-
tuation, so what was novel once gradually becomes less and less
interesting. When a new style is introduced, initially it offers novelty so
even relatively simple artifacts are considered interesting. Over time,
more and more ideas are explored in that style, but eventually the
potential of that style is used up, and a new style is called for. This
model predicts a periodic change of style. Martindale provided em-
pirical support for his theory by historiometric analysis of French,
British, and American poetry, European and American painting, Japa-
nese prints, and other genres. The aspect of the model relevant for the
discussion here is simply that algorithmic methods based on past his-
tory may able to predict evolution within a style, but not the emergence
of a new style. Perhaps they can predict that a new style will emerge,
based on the periodicity of the style change, but they cannot predict the
content of the style. Consider, for instance, the work of Ni et al. (2011),
who trained their program with the official UK top-40 singles chart over
the past 50 years to learn as to what makes a song popular. A program
like this might successfully predict the winner of the future Eurovision
competitions, but it cannot predict drastic changes in the aesthetic
values and tastes like atonal music or abstract art. The implication of
this for moral machines is that a machine-learning approach based on
past data cannot learn, for example, that slavery is immoral, for it re-
quires modeling something akin to a Kuhnian revolution.
Another limitation of the algorithmic methods to predict the future
based on the past is that they do not take into account what the effect of
the action based on the prediction will have on the future. Starr (2014,
p. 3) points this out as well: “What judges need to know is not just how
‘risky’ the defendant is in some absolute sense, but rather how the
sentencing decision will affect his recidivism risk. For example, if a
judge is deciding between a one-year and a two-year prison sentence for
a minor drug dealer, it is not very helpful to know that the defendant's
characteristics predict a ‘high’ recidivism risk, absent additional in-
formation that tells the judge how much the additional year in prison
will reduce (or increase) that risk. Current risk prediction instruments
do not provide that additional information.” (Emphasis original.)
Moreover, once the algorithmic methods are known, people alter
their behavior in order to achieve the desired result. This can be con-
sidered as the Minority Report effect, for it was the basis of a short story
with this title by Philip K. Dick. Some examples illustrating this phe-
nomenon are the manipulation of electoral district boundaries in the US
by individual parties in order to give them a demographic advantage,
which is known as Gerrymandering (Mann 2006), and various efforts
people make to increase the rank of their webpage in Google search
queries (Hamilton 2009).
Thus, we see that when a decision process is formalized based on
rational principles, and an algorithmic version is devised, people accept
the results of this process. But a similar approach applied to decision
making by machines is not so easily accepted by people. We can notice
an analogous trend in robot behavior. Humans practice for long hours
over weeks, months and years, to be able to juggle blindfolded, or do
synchronized swimming or dancing with a partner with perfect preci-
sion. In sports competitions like Olympics, smallest imperfections with
respect to the timing may cost crucial tenths of a point. For robots, on
the other hand, such tasks as juggling blindfolded or doing synchro-
nized actions (swimming or dancing) are relatively easy, but it also
makes them more machine-like (which they are). For example, starting
from a bounce-juggling robot designed by Claude Shannon in the
1970s, there have been many other robots that juggle by predicting the
trajectory of the bounced or tossed ball. This is because it easy to
predict the trajectory of a tossed ball and place the robot arm at the
expected place. However, to juggle based on visual perception, as in
juggling with a partner, is a much harder task. It is only recently that
robots have been developed which can play catch based on visual
feedback. Similarly, robots can be programmed easily to move in syn-
chrony. But when a robot engineer programs a group of robots to dance,
they are purposely programmed to dance a little bit off so that it is more
human like (See for instance, Peng et al., 2016.).
The point here is that in order to make the machine behavior (in this
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case moral decision making) acceptable to people, we need to generate
explanations behind decision making that are psychologically compel-
ling. So even though a machine may make a decision based on some
calculated probabilities based on logic, it is important to explain it from
a psychological point of view. This is illustrated by the experience of the
designers of one of the first AI backward-chaining expert systems,Mycin
(Shortliffe 1976), which was found to be lacking in explanations, and
this feature was added later in Emycin (Ulug 1986).
A related psychological issue that needs to be considered is that
generally people apply different moral criteria for themselves than to
others. This is illustrated by the research of Bonnefon, Shariff, and
Rahwan (2017), where they found that when it comes to Autonomous
Vehicles (AVs), even though people approve of utilitarian AVs, which
may sacrifice their passengers for the greater good, they themselves
would prefer buying an AV that prioritizes protecting its passengers.
4. Conclusions: Is morality the last frontier?
Assuming that the autonomous decision-making systems are here to
stay, and that there will be situations in which they will be making
moral and ethical decisions, in order that these decisions are accepted
by many (if not all) humans, it is crucial to generate explanations un-
derlying those decisions that are psychologically convincing. To em-
phasize, a rational or logical explanation is not always psychologically
compelling. On the other hand, there is much research to show that
people's behavior is determined by factors that seem irrational but are
nonetheless predictable (See, for instance, Ariely 2009.). We need to
incorporate these factors in an explanation module that generates
psychological justifications for the decisions of any autonomous system.
Some AI researchers are fully aware of this challenge. Ian Sample
(2017), in a recent news article, interviewed Alan Winfield, a professor
of robot ethics: “… [Alan Winfield] agreed that tech firms might
struggle to explain their AI's decisions. Algorithms, especially those
based on deep learning techniques, can be so opaque that it is practi-
cally impossible to explain how they reach decisions. ‘My challenge to
the likes of Google's DeepMind is to invent a deep learning system that
can explain itself,’Winfield said. ‘It could be hard, but for heaven's sake,
there are some pretty bright people working on these systems.’”
The same concern has been echoed by the head of Google's self-
driving car project Dmitri Dolgov: “Over the last year, we've learned
that being a good driver is more than just knowing how to safely na-
vigate around people, [it's also about] knowing how to interact with
them.” (Quoted in Wall 2016). BBC Technology Editor, Matthew Wall
notes: “Driving isn't just about technology and engineering, it's about
human interactions and psychology.” The same can be said about moral
decision-making: it is not just about rationality and logic. To make
moral decisions that can be supported by psychologically acceptable
explanations, it is important to research how humans reason and what
arguments they find persuasive, and incorporate this ability in robots
and other autonomous systems.
Precisely this point is echoed in a recent article by Kuang (2017):
“In many arenas, A.I. methods have advanced with startling speed; deep
neural networks can now detect certain kinds of cancer as accurately as
a human. But human doctors still have to make the decisions – and they
won't trust an A.I. unless it can explain itself. This isn't merely a theo-
retical concern. In 2018, the European Union will begin enforcing a law
requiring that any decision made by a machine be readily explainable,
on penalty of fines that could cost companies like Google and Facebook
billions of dollars.” All this has stimulated a flurry of research activities
on Explainable Artificial Intelligence in recent years (Aha et al., 2017;
Gunning 2016; Indurkhya and Misztal-Radecka 2016; Olah et al., 2017;
Schwiep 2017).
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